Theory and History of Ontology

by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co

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Parmenides of Elea. Annotated Bibliography: Corn - G

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  1. Cornford, Francis Macdonald. 1933. "Parmenides Two Ways." Classical Quarterly no. 1933:97-111.

  2. ———. 1935. "A New Fragment of Parmenides." Classical Review no. 49:122-123.

    "Comments briefly on a fragment of Parmenides quoted by Plato ( Theaetetus 180d) and by Simplicius ( Physica). Notes that once this fragment is subjected to an emendation, its authenticity can be assured." [N.]

  3. ———. 1939. Plato and Parmenides. Parmenides' Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides Translated, with an Introduction and a Running Commentary. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & co. Ltd.

    Reprinted by Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980

  4. Cosgrove, Matthew R. 1974. "The Kouros Motif in Parmenides: B1.24." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 19:81-94.

    "Argues that Parmenides presents the recipient of the goddess's discourse as a kouros not to provide us with autobiographical information (such as that he was a young man when he wrote the poem) but for literary reasons: it is the inexperience of youth that is being highlighted, just as the reader/hearer is meant to put aside worldly experience in attending to the goddess's words."

  5. Couloubaritsis, Lambros. 1986. Mythe Et Philosophie Chez Parménide. Bruxelles: Ousia.

    Index: Préface de la deuxième édition (1990) 7; Introduction: Le mythe des multiples chemins 9; Chapitre I: Transmutation du mythe 76; Chapitre II: L'émergence de l'ontologie 165; Chapitre III: L'émergence d'une nouvelle physique 261; Conclusion: L'émergence de la philosophie 352; Appendice: Traduction du poème 368; Table de matières 381-382.

    Troisième édition modifiée et augmentéè avec le titre: La Pensée de Parménide - Bruxelles, Ousia, 2008.

    "Dans les pages qui suivent, nous allons tenter d'élucider l'instauration de la philosophie au travers de cette transmutation du mythe, grâce à laquelle se manifestent successivement une problématique de l'être et de la pensée (première partie du poème) et une nouvelle physique (seconde partie). Pour ce faire, nous commencerons par élucider le sens du proème, où le mythe parménidien pose ses fondations en vue d'édifier un nouveau type d'activité, axé exclusivement sur le savoir. Cette première étape de notre recherche nous permettra d'établir plus clairement la pratique parménidienne du mythe et d'en déceler la portée. Ensuite, nous montrerons en quoi l'émergence de l'ontologie est tributaire de la transmutation accomplie par le mythe des multiples chemins. Le traitement du texte nous aidera à discerner comment, par une sorte de retournement, cette émergence de l'ontologie déstabilise fatalement le mythe lui-même, rendant possible l'instauration de nouveaux discours, comme le discours métaphorique et le logos proprement dit. Mais plus fondamentalement encore, que cette démarche parménidienne institue le penser et la pensée, ouvrant la voie à une appréhension nouvelle des choses en devenir. C'est en effet en nous appuyant sur cette problématique de la pensée que nous achèverons notre travail, en indiquant comment, à la fois la prise en considération des diverses critiques que Parménide adresse à ses prédécesseurs (117) et une certaine réorganisation des fragments (118) autorisent à établir l'émergence d'une nouvelle physique, fort différente de celle des Ioniens, non seulement parce qu'elle met en œuvre une cosmogonie quasi-mythique, fondée sur deux entités, mais aussi et surtout parce qu'elle s'institue grâce à l'usage même de la pensée, qui seule peut accorder le devenir aux lois de l'être, lui assurant, de ce fait même, une crédibilité. Par là, le poème parménidien nous apparaîtra dans toute sa cohérence: en vue d'instaurer la philo-sophie le mythe des multiples chemins nous conduit vers la compréhension du cosmos en devenir à partir, d'une part, de l'institution de l'ontologie comme la condition même d'une pensée susceptible de le prendre comme objet possible d'un savoir et, d'autre part, de l'édification d'une physique qui suppose l'impossible ontologisation du réel en devenir." (pp. 74-75)

    (117) En distinguant la critique concernant les akrita phyla de celle des "mortels" qui, au contraire, séparent le corps du réel sans chercher l'unité des deux entités qu'il établissent.

    (118) En situant le fr. 4 dans la seconde partie du poème. Voir l'Appendice de cet ouvrage, où nous introduisons d'autres réaménagements

    de moindre importance.

  6. ———. 1987. "Les Multiples Chemins De Parménide." In Études Sur Parménide. Tome Ii. Problèmes D'interprétation, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 25-43. Paris: Vrin.

    "Des nombreuses difficultés qui subsistent encore dans le Poème de Parménide, les plus importantes nous paraissent celles qui touchent aux trois éléments mêmes du texte: le sens à accorder au mythe qui l'introduit, la représentation que l'on devrait se donner de l' eon, y compris son rapport énigmatique à la question de la pensée, et enfin la signification de la doxa et son lien éventuel avec le discours sur alétheia. Bref, ce qui est toujours en jeu, c'est encore aujourd'hui, comme autrefois, la cohérence mémé du texte parménidien et donc son unité." p. 25

  7. ———. 2009. La Pensée De Parménide. Bruxelles: Ousia.

    Troisième édition modifiée et augmentée de Mythe et Philosophie chez Parmenide, Bruxelles, Ousia, 1986.

    Index: Préface de la troisième édition 9; Introduction: L'avénement de la pensée 27; Chapitre I: Le mythe des multiples chemins 57; Chapitre II: Le "Proème" comme producteur de chemins 121; Chapitre III: Transmutation du mythe 197; Chapitre IV: L'émergence de l' eon 243; Chapitre V: Le statut de l' eon 297; Chapitre VI: La question de la pensée 343; Chapitre VII: Au seuil d'une nouvelle distorsion 405; Chapitre VIII: Les traces d'un univers perdu 445; Conclusion: L'émergence de la philosophie 515; Appendice: Texte et traduction 537; Auteurs cités 559; Table des matières 569-570.

    "Ce livre constitue une nouvelle version, modifiée et augmentée de Mythe et Philosophie chez Parménide (1986, 1990 deuxième édition). Parallèlement à une réévaluation de la question du mythe qui différencie le mythos comme façon de parler autorisée, et le logos comme discours catalogique, cette nouvelle livraison refuse, pour l' eon parménidien, le sens anachronique d' "être" ou d' "étant", et distingue eon / eonta (ce qui est dans le présent / choses qui sont dans le présent) et on / onta (ce qui est ou étant / choses qui sont ou étants), accordant ainsi une prééminence au temps, en l'occurrence au "maintenant". Par là, l'auteur prend davantage encore ses distances par rapport aux interprétations dominantes, et propose comme centre d'analyse le penser et la pensée. Légitimée par "Ce qui est dans le présent" ( eon) d'une façon absolue et permanente qui en est la condition "inviolable" ( asylon), la pensée est appliquée au devenir des "choses qui ne sont pas dans le présent" ( mè eonta), "choses ab-sentes" ( apeonta), et les convertit en "choses pré-sentes" (pareonta), sans jamais les identifier à une forme d'être. Grâce à cette promotion du présent dans le devenir, l'impossible ontologisation du réel en devenir s'accompagne néanmoins de la possible édification d'une nouvelle physique, différente de celle des premiers Ioniens, à savoir une physique du mélange, fondée sur l'unité de deux "formes", la lumière et l'obscurité, se référant au Feu et à la Terre, et dont le statut doxatique transforme le "nominalisme" propre au devenir des choses éphémères en une pensée de la doxa. Ce cheminement complexe donne une solution nouvelle au problème toujours en débat de l' unité du Poème, et laisse percevoir, par la transmutation du mythe archaïque, l'émergence de la philosophie comme aspiration au savoir, grâce à l'irruption de la pensée qui, en l'homme, puise sa continuité dans l'inflexibilité de "Ce qui est dans le présent", dont l'enracinement dans la flexibilité de la physis réussit à équilibrer et à fonder la force différenciante de la parole."

  8. Coxon, Allan H. 1934. "The Philosophy of Parmenides." Classical Quarterly no. 28:134-144.

    "In the Classical Quarterly for April, 5933, Professor Cornford maintains that the Two Ways' of Parmenides are not meant as alternatives: "The Way of Truth and the Way of Seeming are no more parallel and alternative systems of cosmology, each complete in itself, than are Plato's accounts of the intellectual and sensible worlds." (p. 102) I wish here to try to support his general view, which seems to me to be indisputably correct, while differing from Professor Cornford in some important details." (p. 134).

  9. ———. 1969. "The Text of Parmenides Fr. 1,3." Classical Quarterly no. 18:69.

    "In all texts of the fragments of Parmenides printed in the last fifty years he begins his poem by speaking of "the way which" (or, according to some, "the goddess who") "carries through all towns the man who knows ..." In fact aste, which is alleged to be the reading of the best manuscript of Sextus' books Adversus Dogmaticos, has no manuscript authority at all. aste first appeared in the text of the third edition of Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker published in 1912, where it is attributed to the Ms. N (= Laur.85.19), so called by Mutschmann.... The "countless attempts at emendation" of [the readings of L and E et al., pantate and panta te it respectively] did not include aste. Variants from N were first published in 1911 by A. Kochalsky in his dissertation..., but his professedly complete list of new readings from N for these books of Sextus includes no reference to Parmenides 1.3. It follows that aste can hardly have appeared among the variants which he says he had already communicated to Diels. The word aste appears, however, as the reading of N in vol. ii of Mutschmann's text of Sextus, which was published in 1914. It would seem, therefore, that Diels got the reading privately from Mutschmann, who collated N in 1909 and 1911. . . . In any case, the word is a simple misreading of the manuscript, which has pant' ate." (p. 69)

  10. ———. 1969. "The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics I-Iv." Classical Quarterly no. 18:70-75.

  11. ———. 1986. The Fragments of Parmenides. A Critical Text with Introduction, Translation, the Ancient Testimonia and a Commentary. Assen: Van Gorcum.

    Contents: Preface V-VI; Introduction 1; Text and Translation of the Fragments 41; The Ancient Testimonia 95; Commentary 156; Appendix 257; Index 267-277.

    "Parmenides' poem is dominated by his conviction that human beings can attain knowledge of reality or understanding ( nóos). This faith is expressed in the apocalyptic form of the poem, which at the same time offers an analysis of its presuppositions, and which may be regarded as an attempt to answer the questions, 'what must reality be, if it is knowable by the human mind, and what is the nature of human experience?

    The ontological part of the work comprises an account of two intellectually conceivable ways of discovering reality ( aletheín), followed by a summary analysis of its character as revealed by pursuing the only way allowed to be genuine. The ways are defined respectively by the formulae 'is and is not for not being', and 'is not and must needs not be', and the recognition that they are mutually exclusive and exhaustive is represented (in opposition to the evidence of the senses) as itself constituting the only criterion (fr. 7, 5) for determining what is real: nothing is to be so considered, unless it either is intrinsically something, or of necessity is not anything. Since the second way is argued to be concerned with nothing and to lead nowhere, reality is to he identified by pursuing the first, i.e. by asking what can and must be made the subject of an unconditional 'is'.

    Although Parmenides defines his conception of philosophy in terms of the expressions 'is' and 'is not', he gives no explicit indication of the sense which he conceives these expressions to bear. Modern exegesis has in consequence saddled him with, most generally, an existential understanding of the verb, or else with an archaic failure to distinguish between its existential and copulative uses. It is better to recognise that his approach is purely formal or dialectical, i.e. that, so far from positing any given sense of the verb, he is concerned to determine what sense attaches to it, given its essential role in 'asserting and thinking'. In the prologue and in the cosmological part of the poem he uses the verb `to be' either with an adverbial qualification or with a further predicate (e.g. frr. 1, 32; 8, 39, 57; 20, 1), but in defining 'the only ways of enquiry which can be thought' (fr. 3, 2), he isolates the expressions 'is' and 'is not' deliberately both from any determinate subject and from any further completion. In so doing he assigns to them no restricted sense but treats them as the marks of 'asserting and thinking', with the possibility and presuppositions of which he is concerned throughout (cf. fr. 3, 8n.). His aim in defining the 'genuine way of enquiry' as the expression 'is' is to discover (I) what, if anything, can be said and thought `to be' something without the possibility of denial that it is that thing, and (ii) what this subject can further be said 'to be', i.e. what further predicates can be asserted of it. He answers these questions by converting the verb 'is' to the noun-expression 'Being' (eon) and then arguing for the nature of what this name must denote. The 'is' which constitutes the definition of the way is thus reformulated as the copula with 'Being' as its subject: 'Being is ungenerated and imperishable, complete, unique, unvarying' etc. (fr. 8, 3-5). Initially the nature and number f 'Being', like the sense of 'is', remain wholly undetermined except as what 'is and is not for not being'. Its further determination, culminating in its characterisation as non-physical, is argued in the account in fr. 8 of the many landmarks or monuments on the authentic way of enquiry, i.e. of the terms which can be asserted of the subject, and the question arises, 'how does Parmenides envisage the relation between the subject, 'Being', and the terms joined with it by the copula?'

    Among the landmarks on the authentic way are the unity or indivisibility of Being and its uniqueness. If what is is one and unique, Parmenides cannot well suppose that the terms which he predicates of it are the names of distinct attributes, which would have their own being and so be eonta. He must therefore regard them as alternative names of Being. This was Plato's understanding of his meaning (cf. Sections 7 and 8 below), which is confirmed by Eudemus' assertion that it was Plato himself who first introduced two senses of the verb `to be' by discriminating between its substantial and attributive uses (cf. Sect. 8). It is confirmed also by the Megarian view of predication as identification (cf. Sect. 6 ad fin.), for the Megarians were regarded as latterday Eleatics (tt. 102, 132). Aristotle likewise insists (tt. 19, 21, 27) that Parmenides ascribed to 'being' only a single sense, whence he was led to suppose that what is other than Being itself has no being at all. Thus both the text and the Platonic and Peripatetic exegesis of it indicate that Parmenides' copulative use of 'is' in his account of the authentic way signifies an identity which is the direct expression of the perfect identity of substantial Being." pp. 19-21

  12. ———. 2003. "Parmenides on Thinking and Being." Mnemosyne no. 56:210-212.

    "On the interpretation of fr. B 3 Diels-Kranz. If Zeller's interpretation, which translates the phrase to gar auto noein esti te kai einai as "the same is for thinking and for being", i.e. "it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be", was right, B3 asserts that the object of thinking is identical with the subject of the verb "to be". Parmenides nowhere identifies being and thinking, but maintains that the perfection of Being is the cause of the "thought" of its limitation, and so of that of its unchanging identity and self-subsistence (B 8.29-31)."

  13. Crystal, Ian. 2002. "The Scope of Thought in Parmenides." Classical Quarterly no. 52:207-219.

    "Concerning the relation between the thinker and that which is thought, Parmenides puts forth a monistic thesis that entails the strict identification of the epistemic subject and object. This identity relation does not emerge until Parmenides' account of qualitative homogeneity in fr. 8; thus we cannot attribute this position to Parmenides prior to fr. 8."

  14. Curd, Patricia. 1991. "Parmenidean Monism." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 36:241-264.

    "The paper argues that Parmenides adopts neither material nor numerical monism; rather his arguments about the only acceptable account of being show him to be committed to what I call predicational monism. Whatever is must be a predicational unit, but this is consistent with there being a numerical plurality of ones. The paper begins with a consideration of the esti and its subject in B2, and with attention to the setting and context of Parmenides' philosophical project. It next considers a number of arguments in the Aletheia section of the poem, and then turns to the relation of Parmenides to the philosophers who came after him, especially the Atomists and the Pluralists."

  15. ———. 1992. "Deception and Belief in Parmenides' "Doxa"." Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science no. 25:109-134.

    "An examination and account of Parmenides' Doxa. There is deception in the Doxa, in the dualistic account of Light and Night; but Parmenides does not renounce all human belief. While Parmenides does not give the account, a story about the sensible world that is consistent with the Aletheia can be told. While the particular account given in the Doxa fails, the Doxa has something positive to say about mortal belief. Parmenides supposes that a trustworthy cosmology may be possible and discloses what such a theory might be like and how it could be tested."

  16. ———. 1998. "Eleatic Arguments." In Method in Ancient Philosophy, edited by Jyl, Gentzler, 1-28. New York: Oxford University Press.

    "In this essay I shall limit my discussion of philosophical method to issues connected with presenting and arguing for philosophical theories or with appraising the adequacy of theories. I shall suggest that there are three stages in the development of pre-Socratic method. First, there is the mere assertion of one's theory; second, there is the giving of arguments for first principles or against other theories. Finally, in the third stage, there are the development and application of criteria for acceptable theories, combined with using these criteria to rule out whole classes of competing theories. I shall argue that the second stage appears in a rough form in Xenophanes and Heraclitus (for they reject, but do not actually argue against, the views of others), but that the full-blown philosophical method of the second and third stages together first appears in Parmenides; it is he who first uses arguments directly in support of his philosophical position (and against the positions of others) and who first stresses the criteria for the acceptability of arguments about nature. But, as I shall also argue, since in Parmenides there is also the reliance on assertion as opposed to argument that characterizes nearly all pre-Eleatic philosophy, Parmenides himself is a transitional figure. I begin with a survey of pre-Eleatic pre-Socratic theories. I then examine the various roles played by assertion, argument, and theory evaluation in Parmenides' thought. Finally, I discuss some of the argumentative strategies in Parmenides' Eleatic followers, Zeno and Melissus." p. 2

  17. ———. 1998. The Legacy of Parmenides. Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Second edition with a new introduction Las Vegas, Parmenides Publishing, 2004.

    Contents: Preface: IX; Acknowledgments XI; A note on texts and translations XIII; Abbreviations XV; Introduction 3; I. Parmenides and the inquiry into Nature 24; II. Parmenides' Monism and the argument of B8 64; III. Doxa and deception 98; IV. Pluralism after Parmenides 127; V. Atoms, void, and rearrangement 180, VI. Final remarks 217; Bibliography 243; Index locorum 257; Index nominum 264; General index 269-280.

    "This book offers an alternative account of the views of Parmenides and his influence on later Presocratic thought, especially Pluralism and Atomism, in the period immediately preceding Plato's Theory of Forms. It challenges what has become the standard account of the development of Pluralism (in the theories of Empedocles and Anaxagoras) and Atomism (adopted by Leucippus and Democritus). This alternative interpretation places Parmenides firmly in the tradition of physical inquiry in Presocratic thought, arguing that Parmenides was concerned with the same problems that had occupied his predecessors (although his concern took a different form). Further, this account explains how Parmenides' metaphysical and cosmological doctrines had a positive influence on his successors, and how they were used and modified by the later Eleatics Zeno and Melissus.

    In the course of this book, I shall argue against both the prevailing interpretation of Parmenides' monism and the usual explanation of the "is" in Parmenides. Instead, I shall claim that Parmenides' subject is what it is to be the genuine nature of something, thus linking Parmenides with the inquiries into nature of his philosophical predecessors. On the view for which I shall argue, the "is" that concerns Parmenides is a predicational "is" of a particularly strong sort rather than an existential "is." I accept that Parmenides is a monist, but I deny that he is a numerical monist. Rather, I claim that Parmenides is committed to what I call predicational monism. (5)

    Numerical monism asserts that there exists only one thing: a complete list of entities in the universe would have only one entry. This is the kind of monism that has traditionally been attributed to Parmenides and (rightly) to Melissus. Predicational monism is the claim that each thing that is can be only one thing; and must be that in a particularly strong way. To be a genuine entity, something that is metaphysically basic, a thing must be a predicational unity, a being of a single kind ( mounogenes, as Parmenides says in B8.4), with a single account of what it is; but it need not be the case that there exists only one such thing. What must be the case is that the thing itself must be a unified whole. If it is, say F (whatever F turns out to be), it must be all, only, and completely F. On predicational monism, a numerical plurality of such one-beings (as we might call them) is possible. (6) The interpretation of Parmenides' "is" becomes relevant here, for I argue that to be for Parmenides is to be the nature of a thing, what a thing genuinely is, and thus metaphysically basic. The arguments of Parmenides' fragment B8 concern the criteria for what-is, that is, for being the nature of something, where such a nature is what a thing really is. Those arguments purport to show that what-is must be whole, complete, unchanging, and of a single kind. Each thing that is can have only one nature, but there may be many such things that satisfy Parmenides' criteria.' These issues are the subjects of Chapters I and II." (pp. 4-5)

    (5) Mourelatos (in Route) and Barnes ("Eleatic One") have also questioned the predominant view that Parmenides is a numerical monist; Barnes denies any sort of monism to Parmenides, and Mourelatos emphasizes Parmenides' anti-dualism.

    (6)Thus, the failure of later Presocratic thinkers to argue for their pluralistic theories, while working within a Parmenidean framework and stressing the reality and predicational unity of their basic entities, is evidence for my view that it is possible for there to be a numerical plurality of entities each of which is predicationally one.

    (7) In later terminology we might say that Parmenides is searching for an account of what it is to be the essence of something, although I have avoided the word essence because it is an anachronistic term in Presocratic thought. There is, however, a connection between Parmenides' search for what-is and Aristotle's accounts of ousia and to ti en einai; the connection runs through Plato's Theory of Forms, which itself has Parmenidean roots.

  18. ———. 2006. "Parmenides and After: Unity and Plurality." In A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, edited by Louise, Gill Mary and Pierre, Pellegrin, 34-55. Oxford: Blackwell.

    "A helpful way to approach the question of Parmenides' importance for Greek philosophy is to examine questions of unity and plurality in pre-Socratic thought. seeing how these questions dovetail with those about the possibility of genuine knowledge and its object. In this chapter, I shall argue that Parmenides' criticisms of his predecessors rest on the principle that what can be genuinely known must be a unity of a particular sort, which I call a predicational unity. On this view, anything that genuinely is (that truly can be said to be). and so can be known, must be of a single, wholly unified kind. Parmenides drew confusions from this that later philosophers took very seriously. One consequence is that what is genuinely real cannot come to be, pass away, or after, thus posing the problems of change and knowledge: How can we account for the appearance of change that we see in the world around us? And how can we have knowledge of such a changing world? An advantage of viewing Parmenides in this way is that it makes sense of the cosmological theorizing of post-Parmenidean figures such as Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus. All these philosophers were (in their different ways) pluralists, holding that there is a numerical plurality of metaphysically basic entities: and yet, I shall argue, all were working in the Parmenidean tradition because they all accepted Parmenides' criteria for what is genuinely real."

  19. Destrée, Pierre. 2000. "La Communauté De L'être: Parménide Fr. B5." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 18:3-13.

  20. Dixsaut, Monique. 1987. "Platon Et Le Logos De Parménide." In Études Sur Parménide. Tome Ii. Problèmes D'interprétation, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 215-253. Paris: Vrin.

    "Avant d'aborder l'examen critique des doctrines de l'être, l'Étranger adresse trois prières à Théétète. Dans la première, il lui demande de se contenter «du peu qu'on pourra gagner, par quelque biais que ce soit, sur un logos aussi fort que celui de Parménide»; dans la deuxième, de ne point le regarder comme un parricide «s'il est contraint de mettre à l'épreuve le logos de son père Parménide»; dans la troisième, de ne pas l'accuser de manquer de mesure, de délirer, s'il «entreprend de réfuter ce logos», à supposer qu'il en soit capable ( Sophiste 241c-242a).

    Du sens que l'on accorde à cette manière d'annoncer l'entreprise comme mise à l'épreuve d'un logos fort, paternel et sacré -- et de l'importance que l'on attache (ou non) à cette manière de l'introduire, dépend toute la lecture du texte qui suit. La relecture de ce célèbre passage du Sophiste aura donc pour objet de déterminer sur quoi porte exactement la réfutation, comment et dans quel but elle se conduit."

  21. Dominique, Dubarle. 1973. "Le Poème De Parménide, Doctrine Du Savoir Et Premier État D'une Doctrine De L'être (Deuxième Partie)." Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques no. 57:397-432.

  22. Drozdek, Adam. 2001. "Eleatic Being." Hermes.Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie no. 129:306-313.

    "The extant fragments indicate that there is a fundamental agreement between the two Eleatic philosophers, Melissus and Parmenides concerning characteristics of Being. Like Parmenides Melissus asserts that Being is eternal (30B1, B2, B4), immovable (B7.7-10, B10). complete (82), and unique (B5, B6). The physical world is unreal because it is characterized by "change, multiplicity, temporal succession and imperfection" (B8). Being cannot be known through sensory perception because senses indicate that things are constantly changing, which directly contradicts the immutability of Being (B7). However, as commonly assumed, there is at least one fundamental difference between them. Melissus considers Being infinite, whereas for Parmenides Being is finite because it is held in limits (28B8.26,31,42) and is compared to a sphere (B8.42-43). Does the limited/unlimited difference signify the modification introduced by Melissus to the Eleatic philosophy?"

  23. ———. 2001. "Parmenides' Theology." Eranos.Acta Philologica Suecana no. 99:4-15.

    Reprinted as Chapter 4 in: A. Drozdek, Greek Philosophers as Theologians. The Divine A rche, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007. pp. 43-52.

  24. Drvota, Tomas. 2006. "Die Kosmologie Des Parmenides." Listy Filologické no. 129:1-50.

    From the English Summary: "The question why the poem of Parmenides includes a detailed account of the origin and the order of the world that according to his ontology is deprived of truth, cannot be answered with certainty. There are affinites between the Parmenides' cosmos and his absolute hen, and so the ancient idea of the unity of god and the cosmos seems to be at the background of his philosophical system.

    (...)

    On the basis of this reconstruction it is possible to outline the main features of the Parmenidean cosmological system. It is a very archaic conception of the universe divided into three spheres, paralled in the Babylonian and Indian cosmography. In contrast to the systems recognizing the seven planets, in this case the fixed stars are located under the sun. In Greece, this system is recognizable in the thought of Anaximander, Metrodorus or Leucippus as a parallel to the more developed Pythagorean model.

    Another important feature of this system is a contraposition of two balancing cosmic principles, Fire and Earth. A dark and solid principle is represented in the very centre, while the edges are dominated by a principle that is light and thin. Between these extremes, there is a gradual transition from one

    principle to the other. In the process of creation of a cosmos, these two elementarily pure principles mingle and mix. Yet whenever this process is referred to as 'hateful' or 'abominable' ( stygeros), we can assume that everything that stems from it has a negative character. In the proem, Parmenides

    describes a passage leading out of this world and towards knowledge of eternal and immutable truth." (pp. 48-50).

  25. Dubarle, Dominique. 1973. "Le Poème De Parménide, Doctrine Du Savoir Et Premier État D'une Doctrine De L'être (Première Partie)." Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques no. 57:3-34.

  26. Ebert, Theodor. 1989. "Wo Beginnt Der Weg Der Doxa? Eine Textumstellung Im Fragmente 8 Des Parmenides." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 34:121-138.

    "Taking up a proposal made by Guido Calogero in 1936, the paper argues for a transposition of Parmenides fr 8, 34-41 behind 8, 52. It is claimed that this alteration yields a better text on philological as well as on philosophical grounds. The proposed new arrangement would make fr 8, 34-41 the starting point of the doxa-part in Parmenides' Poem".

  27. Ferreira, Fernando. 1999. "On the Parmenidean Misconception." Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy no. 2:37-49.

  28. Finkelberg, Aryeh. 1986. "The Cosmology of Parmenides." American Journal of Philology no. 107:303-317.

    "The argument of the article is that Aetius' account, the main source on Parmenides' cosmology, is quite intelligible and compatible with Parmenides' fr. 12, and not garbled and confused as usually held. The article is an attempt at reconstructing Parmenides' cosmology based on Aetius' account and some additional information found in Parmenides' authentic lines and doxographical reports." [N.]

  29. ———. 1988. "Parmenides: Between Mterial and Logical Monism." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 70:1-14.

    "Studies the import of the conception of monism as it surfaces in the philosophy of Parmenides, remarking that by introducing the idea of Being as a unitary and self-existing reality, he was able to sustain the vision of a monistic world, in which neither non-Being, nor plurality, nor movement can be conceived of as real. Regards Parmenidean monism as a logical entailment made necessary by the idea of Being." [N.]

  30. ———. 1988. "Parmenides' Foundation of the Way of Truth." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 6:39-67.

    "The problem of the subject of estin and ouk estin in B 2.3 and 5 is one of the most controversial issues in Parmenides scholarship. The usual approach is that estin and ouk estin have a subject, which, however, remains unexpressed. Now by unexpressed subject one may mean that (a) a given utterance has a logical subject which is not expressed grammatically but is supplied by the immediate context, or (b) a given utterance has a logical subject which is neither expressed by means of a grammatical subject nor supplied by the immediate context. The case (a) is an instance of an ordinary linguistic phenomenon called ellipsis; the case (b) is either grammatically nonsensical or an example of unintelligible speech." p. 39

    (...)

    "Below I argue that einai is the only subject that meets this requirement. Proceeding from this assumption, I argue that einai should be distinguished from eon and that the 'ways' of B 2 are not so much ontological statements as logical-linguistic patterns whose truth and falsehood are self-evident.

    These patterns serve in Parmenides as the basis of the subsequent deduction of true existential assertions about Being and not-Being, and I try to show that, if taken in this perspective, all the extant fragments preceding B 8, from B 2 to B 7, constitute a single argument whose detailed reconstruction I propose in the second section of the article. Finally, in the third section, I examine, proceeding from the conclusions arrived at, the question of truth and falsehood in Parmenides in a more general context, which helps to shed light on the respective logical standing of the two parts of Parmenides' poem, the Aletheia and the Doxa." p. 42

  31. ———. 1999. "Being, Truth and Opinion in Parmenides." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 81:233-248.

    "The traditional premise of Parmenidean scholarship is that the theory of Being renders the phenomenal world merely apparent and the account of this world in the Doxa, which raises the tantalizing question of the rationale of Parmenides' supplementing a true theory with a false one. The article challenges this approach and advances the thesis that Parmenides' Being is consistent with material heterogeneity and that, accordingly, the two parts of the poem combine to yield an exhaustive account of reality, the Doxa being a legitimate continuation and a needful complement of the inquiry that begins with the Aletheia."

  32. Floyd, Edwin. 1992. "Why Parmenides Wrote in Verse." Ancient Philosophy no. 12:251-265.

    "Parmenides chose verse (instead of prose) for its many resonances highlighting deception. Prophron at 1.22, for example, has an apparently straightforward meaning "kindly", but in Homer it is used in contexts of divine disguise. Later on in Parmenides' poem, the focus on the immobility of Being (8.37-38) recalls Athena's fateful deception of Hektor in Iliad, book 22. Even more clearly, Doxa shows the pattern too, since the transition from Aletheia at 8.52 parallels a context (Solon, fr l.2, ed. West) in which feigned madness brings about the Athenians's regaining Salamis."

  33. Fränkel, Hermann Ferdinand. 1930. "Parmenidesstudien." Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen:153-192.

    Reprinted in: Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens: literarische und philosophiegeschichtliche Studien edited by Franz Tietze - München, Beck, 1955 (second augmented edition, 1960).

    Revised English traslation as: Studies in Parmenides - in: D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen (eds.) - Studies in presocratic philosophy. Vol. II: The Eleatics and Pluralists - London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975 pp. 1-47.

    "My intention in the following studies is to correct and extend certain essential aspects of our present knowledge of the system of Parmenides by criticism and interpretation of original fragments and testimonia. In so doing, I shall take particular care to keep dose to the wording of the original text, as is done as a matter of course in the interpretation of 'pure' literature, but is easily neglected in the case of a strictly philosophical text, where the content appears to speak for itself, quite independently of the words which happen to be used. And yet much will be radically misunderstood, and many of the best, liveliest and most characteristic features of the doctrine will be missed, if one fails to read the work as an epic poem which belongs to its own period, and to approach it as a historical document, through its language.

    These studies are presented in such a way that only Diels-Kranz is required as a companion." p. 1

  34. Frère, Jean. 1987. "Parménide Et L'ordre Du Monde: Fr. Viii, 50-61." In Études Sur Parménide. Tome Ii. Problèmes D'interprétation, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 192-212. Paris: Vrin.

    "La lecture des derniers vers du fragment VIII de Parménide (v. 50-61) pose un problème difficile. La clôture du discours cernant la Vérité est-elle ouverture sur les débordements d'opinions erronées? Ce morceau terminal ne concerne-t-il pas plutôt les étants en leur relation avec l'Être? La nouveauté de Parménide, depuis le fragment I jusqu'au fragment VIII, v.49, c'est assurément de s'arracher aux conceptions des penseurs de la physis; Parménide s'y montre le premier véritable philosophe de l'Être: mais délaisse-t-il pour autant certains aspects de la physis? La dernière partie de l'œuvre (fr. VIII, v. 50-61; fr. IX à fr. XIX) n'est-elle qu'une critique des opinions erronées des philosophes sur le monde? Ou ne serait- elle pas, bien plutôt, l'articulation de ce qu'il est possible et légitime d'énoncer sur le monde, en tant que les étants sont fondés dans l'Être? Ainsi une lecture approfondie des derniers vers du fragment VIII s'avère-t- elle fondamentale. Déjà les derniers vers du fragment I suggèrent que les dokounta sont fondés dans l'Être. Dans leur prolongement, les derniers vers du fragment VIII n'amorcent-ils pas la mise en place d'une connaissance possible du monde et d'une connaissance possible des étants par rapport à leur fondement dans l'Être?" p. 192

  35. ———. 1991. "Platon, Lecteur De Parménide Dans Le Sophiste." In Études Sur Le Sophiste, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 125-143. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

  36. ———. 2012. Parménide Ou Le Souci Du Vrai. Ontologie, Théologie, Cosmologie. Paris: Éditions Kimé.

  37. Frings, Manfred. 1988. "Parmenides: Heidegger's 1942-1943 Lecture Held at Freiburg University." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 19:15-33.

    "In what follows, I wish to present a number of essentials of Heidegger's lecture, originally entitled, "Heraclitus and Parmenides," which he delivered at Freiburg University in the Winter Semester of 1942/1943. This was at a time when the odds of World War II had turned sharply against the Nazi regime in Germany. Stalingrad held out and the Germans failed to cross the Volga that winter. Talk of an impending "invasion" kept people in suspense. Cities were open to rapidly increasing and intensifying air raids. There wasn't much food left.

    It is amazing that any thinker could have been able to concentrate on pre-Socratic thought at that time. In the lecture, there are no remarks made against the allies; nor are there any to be found that would even remotely support the then German cause. But Communism is hit hard once by Heidegger, who says that it represents an awesome organization-mind in our time.

    There are two factors that somewhat impeded my endeavor of presenting the contents of this lecture:

    1. Heidegger had originally entitled the lecture "Heraclitus and Parmenides." The 1942/43 lecture was followed in 1943 and 1944 by two more lectures on Heraclitus. 2 When I read the manuscripts of the 1942/43 lecture for the first time, I was stunned that Heraclitus was mentioned just five times, and, even then, in more or less loose contexts. I decided that the title of the lecture should be reduced to just "Parmenides" in order to accommodate the initial expectations of the reader and his own thought pursuant to having read and studied it.

    2. While reading the lecture-manuscripts for the first time, another troubling technicality came to my attention: long stretches of the lecture hardly even deal with Parmenides himself, and Heidegger seems to get lost in a number of areas that do, prima facie, appear to be irrelevant to Parmenides. And Heidegger was rather strongly criticized for this in the prestigious literary section of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung to the effect that it was suggested that I could have done even better had I given the lecture an altogether different title and omitted the name Parmenides."

    (Notes omitted).

  38. ———. 1991. "Heidegger's Lectures on Parmenides and Heraclitus (1942-1944)." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 22:197-199.

    "This is a discussion of the coverage of three Lectures Heidegger held on Parmenides and Heraclitus from 1942 to 1944. It is designed on the background of his personal experience during the trip he made to Greece in 1962 as recorded in his diary. The question is raised whether his 1943 arrangement of 10 Heraclitus fragments could be extended by "refitting transformations" of other fragments. The three Lectures are seen as tethered to Heidegger's 1966/67 Heraclitus Seminar. Central to his trip was the island of Delos where he seemingly experienced the free region of Aletheia. A "fragment" in his diary is suggested as a motto for all three Lectures."

  39. Fritz, Kurt von. 1945. " Nous, Noein and Their Derivatives in the Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras). Part I. From the Beginnings to Parmenides." Classical Philology no. 40:223-242.

    Reprinted (with the second part) in: Alexander P. D. Mourelatos - The Pre-Socratics: a collection of critical essays - New York, Anchor Press, 1974; second revised edition, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 23-85 (on Parmenides see pp. 43-52).

    "In an earlier article (1) I tried to analyze the meaning or meanings of the words noos and noein in the Homeric poems, in preparation for an analysis of the importance of these terms in early Greek philosophy. The present article will attempt to cope with this second and somewhat more difficult problem, but to the exclusion of the nous of Anaxagoras, since this very complicated concept requires a separate investigation." p. 23 of the reprint.

    So far it might seem as if Parmenides' concept of noos is still essentially the same as that of his predecessors, including his contemporary Heraclitus. In fact, however, Parmenides brings in an entirely new and heterogeneous element. It is a rather remarkable fact that Heraclitus uses the particle gar only where he explains the ignorance of the common crowd. There is absolutely no gar or any other particle of the same sense in any of the passages in which he explains his own view of the truth. He or his noos sees or grasps the truth and sets it forth. There is neither need nor room for arguments. Homer and Hesiod, likewise, when using the term noos, never imply that someone comes to a conclusion concerning a situation so that the statement could be followed up with a sentence beginning with "for" or "because." A person realizes the situation. That is all. In contrast to this, Parmenides in the central part of his poem has a gar, an épei, oun, eineka, ouneka in almost every sentence. He argues, deduces, tries to prove the truth of his statements by logical reasoning. What is the relation of this reasoning to the noos?

    The answer is given by those passages in which the goddess tells Parmenides which "road of inquiry" he should follow with his noos and from which roads he must keep away his noema.

    These roads, as the majority of the fragments clearly show, are roads or lines of discursive thinking, expressing itself in judgments, arguments, and conclusions. Since the noos is to follow one of the three possible roads of inquiry and to stay away from the others, there can be no doubt that discursive thinking is part of the function of the noos. Yet -- and this is just as important -- noein is not identical with a process of logical deduction pure and simple in the sense of formal logic, a process which through a syllogistic mechanism leads from any set of related premises to conclusions which follow with necessity from those premises, but also a process which in itself is completely unconcerned with, and indifferent to, the truth or untruth of the original premises. It is still the primary function of the noos to be in direct touch with ultimate reality. It reaches this ultimate reality not only at the end and as a result of the logical process, but in a way is in touch with it from the very beginning, since, as Parmenides again and again points out, there is no noos without the eon, in which it unfolds itself. In so far as Parmenides' difficult thought can be explained, the logical process seems to have merely the function of clarifying and confirming what, in a way, has been in the noos from the very beginning and of cleansing it of all foreign elements.

    So for Parmenides himself, what, for lack of a better word, may be called the intuitional element in the noos is still most important. Yet it was not through his "vision" but through the truly or seemingly compelling force of his logical reasoning that he acquired the dominating position in the philosophy of the following century. At the same time, his work marks the most decisive turning-point in the history of the terms noos, noein, etc.; for he was the first consciously to include logical reasoning in the functions of the noos. The notion of noos underwent many other changes in the further history of Greek philosophy, but none as decisive as this. The intuitional element is still present in Plato's and Aristotle's concepts of noos and later again in that of the Neoplatonists. But the term never returned completely to its pre-Parmenidean meaning." pp. 51-52 (notes omitted)

    (1) " Noos and Noein in the Homeric Poems," Classical Philology, 38 (1943), 79-93.

  40. ———. 1946. " Nous, Noein and Their Derivatives in the Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras). Part Ii. The Post-Parmenidean Period." Classical Philology no. 40:12-34.

    Reprinted in: Alexander P. D. Mourelatos - The Pre-Socratics: a collection of critical essays - New York, Anchor Press, 1974 pp. 23-85; second revised edition, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993

  41. Fronterotta, Francesco. 1994. "Essere, Tempo E Pensiero: Parmenide E L' 'Origine Dell'ontologia'." Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa no. 24:835-871.

  42. ———. 1995. "Fra Parmenide E Platone: Una Nuova Edizione Francese Del "Parmenide"." Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana no. 76:382-390.

    "This work is a discussion of Luc Brisson's introduction to a new French translation of Plato's "Parmenides" (GF-Flammarion, Paris 1995). Brisson thinks that, as in the first half of the dialogue Parmenides shows the serious difficulties of Plato's two-level ontology (the world of immortal Forms on the one hand and the world of sensible things on the other), in the second half Plato would demonstrate the absurdity of Parmenides' sensible monism: without the intelligible (and not sensible) Forms, the physical world and the sensible knowledge have no sense. Brisson's interpretation seems to be contradicted by the image of Parmenides in Plato's dialogues (the "Sophist" above all), where the Eleatic philosopher is not represented as a 'sensible' monist, an opponent of Plato's doctrine, but as a tenant of an ontological conception subscribed and developed by Plato. It is argued that second half of the "Parmenides" contains Plato's answers (or possible answers) to the paradoxes of the theory of Forms discussed in the first half."

  43. ———. 2007. "Some Remarks on Noein in Parmenides." In Reading Ancient Texts. Volume I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'brien, edited by Stern-Gillet, Suzanne and Corrigan, Kevin, 3-19. Leiden: Brill.

  44. Furley, David J. 1967. "Parmenides of Elea." In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol Vi, edited by Edwards, Paul, 47-51. New York: Macmillan.

    Second edition of the Encyclopedia edited by Donald M. Borchert, New York, Thomson-Gale, 2006, pp. 122-127, with an Addendum by Patricia Curd, pp. 127-129.

    "David Furley's original entry remains an exemplary introduction to Parmenides' thought. Since its publication, philosophers have focused on the character of the routes of inquiry that the goddess lays out in the poem, suggesting different interpretations of the subjectless is (or esti), and of the nature of to eon, the subject of inquiry. In addition, scholars have continued to study the Proem (the opening lines of the poem) and the Doxa (the goddesses' statement of mortal opinion), but there is no consensus about either." p. 127.

  45. ———. 1973. "Notes on Parmenides." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy:1-15.

    Supplementary vol. I: Exegesis and Argument. Studies in Greek Philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos. Edited by E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty - Assen, Van Gorcum.

    Reprinted in: D. J. Furley, Cosmic Problems - Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989 pp. 27-37.

    "There is a set of problems, much discussed in the literature, concerning the nature of the journey described in B1 of Parmenides, its destination, the revelation made to him by the goddess, and the connection between the symbolism of B1 and the two forms, Light and Night, which are the principles of the cosmology of the Way of Doxa. Some of these problems, I believe, have now been solved. The solution, which is mainly the work of scholars writing in German, (1) has been either overlooked or rejected by the English-speaking community, (2) and it seems worthwhile drawing attention to it and developing it." p. 1

    (1) The essential suggestion was made, without much argument, by Morrison (1955). For detailed arguments, see Mansfeld (1964) 222-61, and Burkert (1969).

    (2) For example, by Guthrie (1965) II, Tarán (1965), myself (1967a), Kahn (1969), and Mourelatos (1970), 15 and n. 19.

  46. Furth, Montgomery. 1968. "Elements of Eleatic Ontology." Journal of the History of Philosophy:111-132.

    Reprinted in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.), The Pre-Socratics. A Collection of Critical Essays, Garden City, Anchor Press, 1974; second revised edition: Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993 - pp. 241-270.

    "The task of an interpreter of Parmenides is to find the simplest, historically most plausible, and philosophically most comprehensible set of assumptions that imply (in a suitably loose sense) the doctrine of `being' set out in Parmenides' poem.' In what follows I offer an interpretation that certainly is simple and that I think should be found comprehensible. Historically, only more cautious claims are possible, for several portions of the general view from which I 'deduce the poem' are not clearly stated in the poem itself; my explanation of this is that they are operating as tacit assumptions, and indeed that the poem is best thought of as an attempt to force these very assumptions to the surface for formulation and criticism-that the poem is a challenge. To be sure, there are dangers in pretending, as for dramatic purposes I shall, that ideas are definite and explicit which for Parmenides himself must have been tacit or vague-that Parmenides knew what he was doing as clearly as I represent him; I try to avoid them, but the risk must be taken. I even believe that not to take it, in the name of preserving his thought pure from anachronous contamination, actually prevents us from seeing the extent to which he, pioneer, was ahead of his time-the argument works both ways. So let me hedge my historical claim in this way: the view I shall discuss could have been an active- indeed a controlling-element of Eleaticism; to suppose that Parmenides held it not only explains the poem, but also helps explain the subsequent reactions to Eleaticism of Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Plato (though there is not space to elaborate this here). In addition, it brings his thought astonishingly close to some contemporary philosophical preoccupations.

    In the first of the following sections, I lay down some sketchy but necessary groundwork concerning the early Greek concept of 'being.' Then in Section 2 an interpretation is given of what I take to be the central Parmenidean doctrine, that 'it cannot be said that anything is not.' This section is the lengthiest and most involved, but it also contains all the moves that appear to be important. Of the remaining sections, Section 3 explains the principle: 'of what is, all that can be said is: it is,' Section 4 deals briefly with the remaining cosmology of "The Way of Truth," and Section 5 considers the question whether Parmenides himself believed the fantastic conclusions of his argument. There is a short postscript on a point of methodology." pp. 111-112

  47. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1988. "Parmenides Oder Das Diesseits Des Seins." Parola del Passato no. 43:143-176.

  48. ———. 1998. The Beginnings of Philosophy. New York: Continuum.

    See chapter 9: Parmenides and the Opinions of Mortals pp. 94-106 and chapter 10: Parmenides on Being pp. 107-125

    "The last line of the second fragment says that it is not possible to formulate that which is not (7) ( me eon), for this can neither be investigated nor communicated.

    It is possible that the third fragment forms the continuation of this text: to gar auto noein estin to kai einai. (8) In the meantime, Agostino Marsoner has convinced me that fragment 3 is not a Parmenides quotation at all but a formulation stemming from Plato himself, which I believe I have correctly interpreted and which Clement of Alexandria has ascribed to Parmenides. In order to

    interpret this fragment, we must confirm that estin does not serve here as a copula but instead means existence (9) and, in fact, not just in the sense that something is there but also in the characteristic classical Greek sense that it is possible, that it has the power to be. Here, of course, "that it is possible" includes that it is. Secondly, we must be clear about what is meant by "the same" (to auto). Since this expression stands at the beginning of the text, it is generally understood as the main point and therefore as the subject. On the contrary, in Parmenides "the same" is always a predicate, hence that which is stated of something. Admittedly, it can also stand as the main point of a sentence, but not in the function of the subject, about which something is stated, but in the function of the predicate that is stated of something. This something in the sentence analyzed here is the relationship between "estin noein" and "estin einai," between "[is] perceiving/thinking" and "[is] being." These two are the same, or, better yet: the two are bound together by an indissoluble unity. (Furthermore, it should be added that the article "to" does not refer to "einai" but to "auto." In the sixth century, an article was not yet placed in front of a verb. In Parmenides' didactic poem, where the necessity arises of expressing what we render with the infinitive of a verb together with a preceding article, a different construction is used.

    This interpretation, the one I am proposing for the third fragment, was, as I recall, the object of a dispute with Heidegger. He disagreed altogether with my view of the evident meaning of the

    poem. I can well understand why Heidegger wanted to hold onto the idea that Parmenides' main theme was identity ( to auto). In Heidegger's eyes, this would have meant that Parmenides himself would have gone beyond every metaphysical way of seeing and would thereby have anticipated a thesis that is later interpreted metaphysically in Western philosophy and has only come into its own in Heidegger's philosophy. Nevertheless, in his last essays Heidegger himself realized that this was an error and that his thesis that Parmenides had to some extent anticipated his own philosophy could not be maintained."

    (7) das Nichtseiende.

    (8) 'For the same thing exists [or, is there) for thinking and for being' (Gadamer will argue against this reading; see below); alternatively, "For thinking and being are the same."

    (9) Existenz.

  49. ———. 2002. Scritti Su Parmenide. Napoli: Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici.

    Indice: Hans Georg Gadamer e 1'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici di Antonio Gargano V-XII;

    Parmenide nell'interpretazione di Kurt Riezler [Gnomon, 2, 1936, pp. 77-86, reprinted in Gesammelte Werke (GW) vol. 6, Mohr Tubingen 1985, pp. 30-38] 3;

    Ritrattazioni [Varia Variorum. Festsgabe für K. Reinhardt, Böhlau-Verlag, Münster, 1952, pp. 58-68, reprinted in GW vol. 6, pp. 38-49] 19;

    Ancora sull'interpretazione di Riezler [ Nachwort to the reprint of K. Rielzler Parmenides, Frankfurt 1970, pp. 92-102, reprinted in GW vol. 6, pp. 49-57] 39;

    Parmenide, ovvero l'aldiqua dell'essere [La Parola del Passato, 43, 1988, pp. 143-176, reprinted in GW, vol. 7, Mohr Tübingen 199, pp. 3-31] 53;

    Testo del poema dottrinale (H. Diels - W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker) 101-106.

  50. Gallop, David. 1979. "'Is or 'Is Not'?" Monist no. 62:61-80.

    "This article reopens some basic problems in the interpretation of the verb 'to be' in the affirmative and negative routes of Parmenides' "Way of Truth." It defends the classical interpretation of 'is' as existential, against various alternative views canvassed in recent literature, including the 'veridical' interpretation of C. H. Kahn, the 'speculative predication' thesis of A. P. D. Mourelatos, and the 'fused' interpretation of R. Furth. With some modifications the article supports the interpretation of G. E. L. Owen, according to which the root difficulty in Parmenides is that of understanding negative existential judgments."

  51. Gemelli Marciano, Maria Laura. 2008. "Images and Experience: At the Roots of Parmenides' Aletheia." Ancient Philosophy no. 28:21-48.

    "In the Aletheia section of his poem (DK 28 B 2-8) Parmenides is at pains not to deliver a logical argument but rather to recount an ecstatic journey into the underworld. Read in this way, the poem communicates and produces a direct experience for the reader. Its meaning lies not in later, logical interpretations but in its direct performative context, to which it itself refers: the context of incubation and ecstatic journeys into the underworld that lead to the roots of truth, to the experience of existence itself or of « IS »."

  52. Germani, Gloria. 1988. " Aletheie in Parmenide." Parola del Passato no. 43:177-206.

  53. Giancola, Donna. 2001. "Towards a Radical Reinterpretation of Parmenides' B3." Journal of Philosophical Research no. 26:635-653.

    "It is generally agreed that Parmenides' fragment B3 posits some type of relation between "thinking" and "Being." I critically examine the modern interpretations of this relation. Beginning with the ancient sources and proceeding into modern times, I try to show that the modern rationalist reading of fragment B3 conflicts with its grammatical syntax and the context of the poem as a whole. In my critique, I suggest that rather than a statement about epistemological relations, it is, as it was originally understood, a religious assertion of metaphysical identity."

  54. Giannantoni, Gabriele. 1988. "Le Due 'Vie' Di Parmenide." Parola del Passato no. 43:207-221.

  55. Goldin, Owen. 1993. "Parmenides on Possibility and Thought." Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science no. 26:19-35.

    "The paper presents an interpretation of Parmenides 6.1-2 according to which Parmenides denies that there are unreal but possible things or states of affairs, on the grounds that possible beings can be understood only as beings and hence as real. Since any object of thought or speech is a possible thing or state of affairs, any object of thought or speech has ontological status.

    Parmenides' argument for the existence of any object of reference or thought does not rely on fallacious modal logic, nor does it rest on a naive or philosophically unsatisfactory blurring of the distinction between the potential and existential uses of einai. He explicitly denies that there are unreal but possible things or states of affairs."

  56. Graeser, Andreas. 1977. "Parmenides Über Sagen Und Denken." Museum Helveticum no. 34:145-155.

    "Explores the relationship among the concept of Being, the function of language, and the reality of eternal truth in the philosophy of Parmenides, emphasizing the intimate and inseparable connection in which they stand related to one another." [N.]

  57. Graham, Daniel W. 2002. "Heraclitus and Parmenides." In Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 27-44. Aldershot: Ashgate.

    "The two most philosophical Presocratics propound the two most radically different philosophies: Heraclitus the philosopher of flux and Parmenides the philosopher of changelessness. Clearly they occupy opposite extremes of the philosophical spectrum. But what is their historical relation? For systematic reasons, Hegel held that Parmenides preceded Heraclitus. But in a footnote of an article published in 1850, Jacob Bernays noticed that in the passage we now know as DK 28 B 6 Parmenides could be seen as criticizing Heraclitus.(*) Bernays' insight had already been widely recognized as the key to the historical relationship between the two philosophers when Alois Patin strongly advocated the Bernays view in a monograph published in 1899. But in 1916 Karl Reinhardt reasserted the view that Heraclitus was reacting to Parmenides. Others argued that no connection. was provable. The Reinhardt view was never popular, while the Bernays-Patin view gradually came to be widely accepted. Twenty-five years ago Michael C. Stokes ( One and many in Presocratic philosophy, 1971) launched a devastating attack on the view that Parmenides was replying to Heraclitus. That attack has never been answered and the Bernays-Patin thesis at present remains undefended.

    In this chapter I wish to argue that the Bernays-Patin thesis is true after all. And in the process of defending it, I hope to show that accepting the thesis has some value for understanding Parmenides beyond the external question of his relation to Heraclitus. Minimally, appreciating Heraclitus' influence on Parmenides will help us understand Parmenides' argument better; but beyond that, it may help us put the whole course of early Greek philosophy in perspective. I shall first review the evidence for a connection between the philosophers (section I), then analyze the evidence for a connection (II), consider the role of historical influences in philosophical exegesis (III), and finally try to reconstruct Parmenides' dialectical opponent from his argument (IV)." (p. 27 notes omitted)

    (*) In his Kleine Schriften (1885), vol. 1, pp. 62-3, n. 1.

  58. ———. 2006. Explaining the Cosmos. The Ionian Tradition of Scientific Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    See Chapter 6: Parmenides' Criticism of Ionian Philosophy pp. 148-185

  59. Granger, Herbert. 2002. "The Cosmology of Mortals." In Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 101-116. Aldershot: Ashgate.

    "The author defends the traditional interpretation of Parmenides' cosmology of mortals, and upholds the view that the portion of the poem devoted to mortal opinions on nature is completely false in its deceptiveness. A cosmology is possible only if a place is made for non-Being, and the cosmic principles of light and night introduce non-Being because they are the rare and the dense. Despite Aristotle's report that Being and non-Being are ranked with light and night, no consistent ranking is possible, and this failure underscores the confusion inherent in mortal opinions on the cosmos."

  60. ———. 2008. "The Proem of Parmenides' Poem." Ancient Philosophy no. 28:1-20.

    "The paper defends the view that the Proem of Parmenides' poem is a secular allegory. At the allegory's center is the unnamed goddess who in the body of the poem instructs the unnamed youth, through her use of a priori argumentation, about the nature of reality. The goddess provides the very symbol for a priori reason, and a central feature of Parmenides' expression of this symbolic value for the goddess is his confused presentation of her in the Proem. His presentation is intentionally vague, and it defies any definitive interpretation that clearly identifies the classification of the goddess and her circumstances within traditional or unconventional Greek religious belief. Instead, she recalls in an confusing fashion traditional revelatory goddesses, of whom the Muses and cult goddesses provide paradigm instances. Hence the youth's journey in the Proem to the unnamed goddess leads to no clearly identifiable circumstances, yet what it arrives at is still bound up within the medium of the standard epic style. Parmenides uses the old idea of the revelatory goddess in this unexpected way to try to show how it harbors something like the exercise of a priori reason. The reflection of the a priori does not reside merely in the similarity that the Muses bestow knowledge, which lies beyond the limited powers of human observation, about past, present, and future. The similarity is stronger and more significant when the Muses grant knowledge that lies beyond their own powers of observation in the form of insights into events they could not have possibly witnessed, such as the birth of the gods. Parmenides picks his unnamed goddess for his symbol for a priori reason because he takes himself to be demythologizing the philosophical truth reflected in a distorted fashion within the tradition of divine revelation. By placing a priori reason in the garb of the revelatory goddess who appears in a puzzling form, Parmenides indicates to his audience that this use of the power of reason has its antecedents in traditional practices that did not recognize this power for its true nature. There is a value in the tradition of divine revelation, which transcends the fictions of the poets in their story-telling, but revelatory deities must now step aside for the clear expression of the power of a priori reason. Hence the goddess abdicates her authority when she demands that the youth judge her words by his logos. Parmenides' verse conforms with his symbolic use of the goddess. It helps him mark his difference from his competitors among the new intellectuals, the so-called `natural philosophers', who generally favor prose over verse. These intellectuals abandoned the Muses and their gift of verse, and they aspire to cosmologies that depend for their justification upon observation and inductive arguments that appeal to analogies and inferences to the best explanation. Verse as the medium of the Muses allows Parmenides to stress in a literary fashion how he adheres to a mode of thinking that does not rely upon the power of observation for the truth."

  61. Groarke, Leo. 1985. "Parmenides' Timeless Universe." Dialogue no. 24:535-541.

    "Argues that Parmenides' Frag. 8 reveals his understanding of the universe as uncreated and ungenerated, and, therefore, absolutely timeless." [N.]

  62. ———. 1987. "Parmenides' Timeless Universe, Again." Dialogue no. 26:549-552.

    "The paper defends my thesis that Parmenides' Poem contains a critique of time, in answer to Mohan Matthen's criticisms of my views."

  63. Guazzoni Foà, Virginia. 1961. Attualità Dell'ontologia Eleatica. Torino: Società Editrice Internazionale.

    Indice: Premessa V-VII; Gli Eleati 1; Senofane 3; Parmenide 35; Zenone 77; Melisso 127; Coclusione 143; Grammatica e filosofia nell'interpretazione di einai, on, ousia 153; Einai 155; On (negli Eleati) 185; Excursus: il tò on oresso Platone ed Aristotele 204; Ousia 221; Conclusione 236; Bibliografia degli Eleati 247; Bibliografia di einai, on, ousia 251-256.

    "Nel presentare questo volume ci sembra utile avvertire il lettore che siamo stati indotti ad unire i nostri due studi (I. Gli Eleati; II. Rapporti tra grammatica e filosofia nell'interpretazione del greco einai, on, ousia) sotto l'unico titolo: Attualità dell'ontologia eleatica per la evidente connessione che é possibile rilevare tra lo studio dei frammenti dei filosofi che appartengono alla scuola di Elea e lo studio dell'essere, nonché tra lo stesso concetto dell'essere che fu da quei pensatori elaborato per la prima volta nella storia della filosofia greca e la problematica attuale su di esso, viva oggi come ieri. Che l'attualità del problema dell'essere sia sentita dagli studiosi contemporanei è prova l'abbondante messe di studi a sfondo idealistico, esistenzialistico, cristiano che sono stati recentemente pubblicati. È anzi particolare merito dello Heidegger l'aver posto e cercato di svolgere il problema dell'essere «come costitutivo essenziale della verità riportandolo al suo significato originario »: (1) è solo mediante lo studio dei Presocratici che, secondo lo Heidegger (2) si può giungere alla conoscenza dell'essere, della verità, del divino. Affermazione questa di grande importanza perché, come risulterà dal nostro studio -- che si discosta, per altro, dalle conclusioni heideggeriane -- é partendo dalla concezione eleatica (e particolarmente parmenidea) che si può giungere alla determinazione dell'essere concepito nel senso cristiano. Con quest'affermazione, com'è ovvio, intendiamo definire sin d'ora, l'atteggiamento del nostro pensiero che é diverso dalla tesi di coloro che considerano l'essere «come elemento logico e verbale dell'affermazione» e da quella esistenzialistica. Mentre la prima poggia sul significato copulativo dell' esti parmenideo e sostiene la dimostrazione della genesi dell'ontologismo parmenideo dal suo logicismo, la seconda tesi, dopo aver escluso l'interpretazione idealistica del significato dell'è del giudizio da ascrivere all' esti parmenideo, procede all'identificazione dell'essere con l'apparire.

    Un esame attento dei frammenti di Parmenide ci porterà a sostenere un valore esistenziale ontologico dell' esti che si legge in essi. A sostegno della nostra interpretazione varranno alcuni rilievi filosofici, glottologici, grammaticali. Basandoci sull'accordo di tutti i filologi nell'ammettere la lezione esti [non enclitico] (e non già esti [enclitico]) nel testo parmenideo, nonchè sul rilievo grammaticale che l'uso di esti parossitono nella lingua greca racchiude in sè un valore esistenziale, sosterremo la presenza di questo valore in Parmenide: quindi il punto di partenza della disquisizione parmenidea è per noi ontologico e non logico e siamo di fronte ad un'ontologicità dell'essere e non ad un'ontologizzazione dell'essere. Dal rilievo glottologico, poi; che è insostenibile l'accostamento semantico della radice bhu di Pso alla radice bha di psaion, che invece vorrebbe lo Heidegger, giungeremo a negare l'identificazione dell'essere con il fenomeno per eccellenza." pp. V-VI.

    (1). Cornelio Fabro, Partecipation et causalité, Louvain, 1961, pag. 153.

    (2) Martin Heidegger, Der Spruch des Anaximander, in Holzwege, Frankfurt a. M., 1950. pag. 296.

  64. Guérard, Christian. 1987. "Parménide D'êlée Chez Les Néoplatoniciens." In Études Sur Parménide. Tome Ii. Problèmes D'interprétation, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 294-313. Paris: Vrin.

    "Dans toute son œuvre conservée, Proclus cite abondamment les fragments orphiques, les Oracles chaldaïques et Homère surtout, mais, somme toute, peu fréquemment Parménide.

    On ne trouve des citations ou des allusions certaines que dans trois seuls ouvrages :

    -- l'un de jeunesse, mais probablement remanié plus tard: l 'In Timaeum;

    -- l'autre de la majorité, et pour nous le plus important : l' In Parmenidem;

    -- le dernier de la fin: la Théologie platonicienne (30).

    À l'évidence, l'Éléate n'est pas pour Proclus une autorité primordiale. Cela se comprend aisément dans la mesure où il ne connaissait pas l'Un avant l'être, et, dans son Poème, ne distingue pas explicitement les différents degrés de la «largeur intelligible». Toutefois, il n'est aucunement regardé comme un adversaire; nous allons le constater en étudiant toutes les citations et allusions évidentes au Poème parménidien." pp. 300-301

    "À l'issue de cette étude, il nous semble possible de définir le néoplatonisme par rapport à sa propre perspective historique.

    Nous avons vu que les rares allusions à Parménide, chez Plotin, font place à des citations textuelles et nombreuses chez Proclus. Le Lycien a peut-être même commenté systématiquement l'Éléate, tant on a l'impression qu'il affine son exégèse à mesure qu'il lit la Voie de la Vérité. Mais ce ne sont là que différences de méthode et de personnalité.

    La pensée néoplatonicienne est rigoureusement identique de Plotin à Proclus: Parménide justifie la lecture théologique du Parménide. C'est parce qu'il a connu l'intellect que, par son hypothèse, Platon a pu s'élever jusqu'à l'Un premier. L'Éléate s'inscrit donc parfaitement dans le mouvement de dévoilement de la Lumière." p. 312

    (30) Signalons que nous ne rencontrons plus aucune citation de Parménide après fe fivre III de cet ouvrage. À part une allusion dans le fivre IV, if n'est question que du personnage du dialogue pfatonicien.

  65. Günther, Hans Christian. 1998. Aletheia Und Doxa: Das Proömium Des Gedichts Des Parmenides. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

  66. Guthrie, William Keith Chambers. 1965. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. Ii: The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    See the First Chapter: The Eleatics. Parmenides - pp. 1-79.

    "Presocratic philosophy is divided into two halves by the name of Parmenides. His exceptional powers of reasoning brought speculation about the origin and constitution of the universe to a halt, and caused it to make a fresh start on different lines. Consequently his chronological position relative to other early philosophers is comparatively easy to determine. Whether or not he directly attacked Heraclitus, (1) had Heraclitus known of Parmenides it is incredible that he would not have denounced him along with Xenophanes and others. Even if ignorance of an Elean on the part of an Ephesian is no sure evidence of date, philosophically Heraclitus must be regarded as pre-Parmenidean, whereas Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus and Democritus are equally certainly post-Parmenidean." p. 1

    (1) See vol. 1, 408 n. 2 and pp. 23 ff, 32 below.

    "The poem of Parmenides raises peculiar problems, and it will be as well to approach the text with the chief of these already in mind. In the prologue he receives from a goddess the promise that she will reveal to him two sorts of information: first the truth about reality, then the opinions of mortals, which are unambiguously said to be false. 'Nevertheless these too shall thou learn' (fr. 1.31). In conformity with this, the first part of the poem deduces the nature of reality from premises asserted to be wholly true, and leads among other things to the conclusion that the world as perceived by the senses is unreal. At this point (fr. 8.50) the goddess solemnly declares that she ceases to speak the truth, and the remainder of the instruction will be 'deceitful'; yet she will impart it all 'that no judgment of men may outstrip thee'. Then follows the second part of the poem consisting of a cosmology on traditional lines. Starting from the assumption of a pair of opposites, 'fire' and 'night' or light and darkness, it proceeds as a narrative of an evolutionary process in time. The 'true way', on the other hand, had asserted that reality was, and must be, a unity in the strictest sense and that any change in it was impossible: there is no before or after, and the exposition unfolds as a timeless series of logical deductions.

    Here is the crux. Why should Parmenides take the trouble to narrate a detailed cosmogony when he has already proved that opposites cannot exist and there can be no cosmogony because plurality and change are inadmissible conceptions? Has it in his eyes no merit or validity whatsoever, so that his purpose in composing it is only to show it up, together with all such attempts at cosmogony, for the hollow shams that they are? If so, the further question arises: what is it? Some have thought it to be based on a particular cosmic system of which he disapproved, for instance that of Heraclitus or the Pythagoreans. Others have suggested, following up the goddess's own words about the 'opinions of mortals' in general, that it is partly or wholly intended as a synthesis of what the ordinary man believed about the world; others again that it is an original production, indeed the best that Parmenides could devise, but still intended to show that even the most plausible account of the origin and nature of the sensible world is utterly false. These critics point to the motive expressed by the goddess, 'that no judgment of mortals may outstrip (or get the better of) thee'.

    An alternative is to suppose that Parmenides is doing his best for the sensible world, perhaps on practical grounds, by giving as coherent an account of it as he can, saying in effect: I have told you the truth, so that if I go on to speak about the world in which we apparently live you will know it is unreal and not be taken in. But after all, this is how it does appear to us; however misleading our senses may be, we must eat and drink and talk, avoid putting our hand in the fire or falling over a precipice, live in short as if their information were genuine. Being ourselves mortals we must come to terms with this deceitful show, and I can at least help you to understand it better than other people.

    These are the most baffling problems which Parmenides presents: the nature of the 'Way of Seeming' and the relation between it and the 'Way of Truth'. Yet the essence of his remarkable achievement lies, as might be expected, within the Way of Truth itself. " pp. 4-6

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