Adamson, Peter. 2002. "Before Essence and Existence: Al-Kindi's Conception of Being." Journal of History of Philosophy no. 40:297-312.
Alonso, Alonso Manuel. 1957. ""Al-Qiwam" Y "Al-Anniyya" En Las Traducciones De Gundisalvo." Al-Andalus no. 22:377-405.
Alverny, Marie-Therèse d'. 1959. "Anniyya - Anitas." In Mélanges Offerts À Étienne Gilson, De L'académie Française, 59-91. Paris: Vrin.
Bashiri, Iraj. 1973. 'To Be' as the Origin of Syntax: A Persian Framework. Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica.
Benardete, Seth. 1977. "The Grammar of Being." Review of Metaphysics no. 30:486-496.
Bos, Egbert Peter. 1998. "The Division of Being over the Categories According to Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus." In John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308):
Renewal of Philosophy, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter, 183-196. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Acts of the Third Symposium organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum (May 23 and 24, 1996).
"The number of categories turns out to be a problem for medieval philosophers. It is pointed out that Aristotle himself was not too consistent in his listings of the categories.
Some medievalists try to deduce the ten categories. Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas do so each in their own (although quite similar) ways, starting from their own respective ontologies. John Duns
Scotus does not undertake any kind of deduction. He stresses the 'realiter' difference between the diverse categories. He only accepts the number of ten categories on the basis of tradition. Scotus
does reduce 'non-entia, figmenta', and so on to 'entia', as member of the categories."
———. 2000. "Nature and Number of the Categories and the Division of Being According to Domingo De Soto." In Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain, edited by Angelelli,
Ignacio and Pérez-Ilzarbe, Paloma, 327-353. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Caster, Kevin K. 1996. "The Distinction between Being and Essence According to Boethius, Avicenna, and William of Auvergne." Modern Schoolman no. 73:309-332.
Chauvier, Stéphane. 2006. "L'étant Sans L'être." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale:495-513.
"Why the analytical tradition has made no room for the question of being as such? We show that the explanation has to be found, not in the alleged empiricist tendencies of that
tradition, but in the fact that the analytical metaphysics in an investigation of the modes of being."
Chiesa, Curzio. 1990. "Idées De Négations." Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie no. 122:353-364.
Conti, Alessandro D. 1989. "Essenza Ed Essere Nel Pensiero Della Tarda Scolastica." Medioevo.Rivista di Storia delle filosofia Medievale no. 15:235-270.
Courtine, Jean-François. 2003. Les Catégories De L'être. Études De Philosophie Ancienne Et Médiévale. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Dumont, Stephen. 1987. "The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: John Duns Scouts and William of Alnwick." Mediaeval Studies no. 49:1-75.
Fabro, Cornelio. 1983. "Intorno Al Fondamento Dell'essere." In Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens, Cssr on the Occasion of His
Seventy-Fifth Birthday and the Fiftieth Anniversary of His Ordination, edited by Gerson, Lloyd, 229-237. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
Fitzpatrick, Noel. 1971. "Walter Chatton on the Univocity of Being: A Reaction to Peter Aureoli and William Ockham." Franciscan Studies no. 31:88-177.
Franck, Didier. 2004. "La Question De L'être: Sens De La Question Et Question Du Sens." In Heidegger L'enigne De L'être, edited by Mattéi, Jean-François, 71-103. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France.
Frank, Richard MacDonough. 1956. "The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term "Anniyya"." Cahiers de Byrsa no. 6:181-201.
Gál, Gedeon. 1992. "Geraldus Odonis on the Univocity of the Concept of Being." Franciscan Studies no. 52:23-30.
Gilson, Étienne. 1952. Being and Some Philosophers. Toronto: Pontifical Insitute of Mediaeval Studies.
Secon edition corrected and enlarged (First edition 1949).
Contents: Preface VII-XI; I. On Being and the One 1; II. Being and Substance 41; III. Essence and Existence 74; V. Being and Existence 154; VI. Knowledge and Existence 190; Appendix
- On Some Difficulties of Interpretation 216; Index 233-235.
Graham, Angus Charles. 1965. "'Being' in Linguistics and Philosophy: A Preliminary Inquiry." Foundations of Language no. 1:223-231.
———. 1967. "'Being' in Classical Chinese." In The Verb "Be" and Its Synonyms, edited by Verhaar, John W.M., 1-39. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing.
Precedent version published as: Being in Western philosophy compared with shih/fei and yu/wu in Chinese philosophy - Asia Major (NS) 7 (1959) 79-112; reprinted in: A. C.
Graham - Studies in Chinese philosophy and philosophical literature Albany, State University of New York Press, 1990. pp. 322-359.
Heidegger, Martin. 2005. En Guise De Contribution À La Grammaire Et À L'étymologie Du Mot 'Être' (Introduction À La Métaphysique, Chap. Ii). Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Édité, traduit de l'allemand et commenté par Pascal David.
Hugonnard-Roche, Henri. 2006. "Le Vocabulaire Philosophique De L'être En Syriaque D'aprés Des Texts De Sergius De Res'aina Et Jacques D'édesse." In Arabic Theology, Arabic
Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebraion of Richard M. Frank, edited by Montgomery, James E., 101-125. Leuven: Peeters.
Husain, Martha. 1976. "The Question 'What Is Being' and Its Aristotelian Answer." New Scholasticism no. 50:293-309.
"This paper takes its point of departure from a recent article by Joseph Owens: "The content of existence," (*) which argues that being is unknowable in terms of concepts since it
either has all cognitive (when contrasted with not-being) or none at all (when contrasted with beings). These dilemmas can be resolved by means of Aristotle's categories as the intrinsic formal
structure of being, and as constituting the cognitive content of being "qua" being. In terms of this cognitive content, being is conceptualized, becomes knowable, and can be meaningfully contrasted
with both not-being and beings. Beyond the resolution of Owens' dilemmas, the paper goes on to examine the need for meaningful contrasts in all knowledge as well as the adequacy and relevance of
Aristotle's categories in relation to modern science."
Joseph Owens - The content of existence - in: Milton K. Munitz (ed.) - Logic and ontology - New York, New York University Press 1973, pp. 21-36.
Jordan, Mark D. 1980. "The Grammar of Esse. Re-Reading Thomas on the Transcendentals." Thomist no. 44:1-26.
Kagame, Alexis. 1956. La Philosophie Bantu-Rwandaise De L'ëtre. Bruxelles: Éditions Duculout.
Reprinted in 1966 by Johnson Reprint Corp., New York.
Kearney, Richard. 1992. "Between Kant and Heidegger. The Modern Question of Being." In At the Heart of the Real. Philosophical Essays in Honour of the Most Reverend Desmond
Connell, Archbishop of Dublin, edited by O'Rourke, Fran, 271-283. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.
Kenny, Anthony. 2002. Aquinas on Being. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Knuuttila, Simo, and Hintikka, Jaakko, eds. 1986. The Logic of Being. Historical Studies. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Table of contents: Acknowledgements VII; Introduction IX; Charles H. Kahn: Retrospect on the verb 'to be' and the concept of Being 1; Benson Mates: Identity and predication in Plato
29; Russell M. Dancy: Aristotle and existence 49; Jaakko Hintikka: The varieties of Being in Aristotle 81; Sten Ebbesen: The Chimera's Diary 115; Klaus Jacobi: Peter Abelard's investigations into the
meaning and functions of the speech sign 'Est' 145; Hermann Weidemann: The logic of Being in Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus 201; Simo Knuuttila: Being qua Being in Thomas Aquinas and John Duns
Scotus 201; Lilli Alanen: On Descartes' argument for dualism and the distinction between different kinds of Beings 223; Jaakko Hintikka: Kant on existence, predication, and the ontological argument
249; Leila Haaparanta: On Frege's concept of Being 269; Index of names: 291; Index of subjects: 297-300.
Llamzon, Benjamin. 1964. "The Specification of 'Esse'; a Study in Bañez." Modern Schoolman no. 41:123-144.
Locker, Ernst. 1954. "Etre Et Avoir. Leurs Expressions Dans Les Langues." Anthropos no. 49:481-510.
Maurer, Armand. 1954. "Henry of Arclay's Question on the Univocity of Being." Mediaeval Studies no. 16:18.
———. 1966. "Cajetan's Notion of Being in His Commentary on the Sentences." Mediaeval Studies no. 28:268-278.
Moro, Andrea. 2010. Breve Storia Del Verbo Essere. Viaggio Al Centro Della Frase. Milano: Adelphi.
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. 1977. "Post-Avicennan Islamic Philosophy and the Study of Being." International Philosophical Quarterly no. 17:265-271.
"In this article, after a brief discussion of the position of Ibn Sina concerning the distinction between existence and essence, a survey is made of the views of later Islamic
thinkers of various schools including "Kalam", "Ishraqi" theosophy and theoretical sufism of the school of Ibn Arabi concerning ontology. The study culminates with Mulla Sadra who brought the
discussion of being among Muslim thinkers to full fruition. After this chronological survey, the distinction between the study of being in later Schools of Islamic thought and those of the West is
made clear and it is shown how despite a similar background, Islamic and Western thought part ways on this basic issue. Later Islamic students of ontology emphasized that the subject of philosophy is
the study of the act of existence, the "actus essendi", while Western thought became ever more concerned with the existent or "ens". In conclusion the relation between the theoretical study of being
and practical and operative spiritual methods for the realization of being in the Islamic world is indicated."
Nijenhuis, John. 1994. "'Ens' Described as 'Being or Existent'." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 68:1-14.
"A recent article in this quarterly about 'Aquinas on 'Exists',' opens with the statement, 'At the outset of On Being and Essence Aquinas distinguishes two senses of 'ens'
(being or existent).' (1) Here, this reader stops 'At the outset' and reflects: is it justifiable-speaking linguistically and metaphysically -- to offer two seemingly alternative if not even
synonymous renderings of the one Latin word ' ens,' viz., 'being' or (and/or) 'existent'?
The present writer belongs to the small chorus of language-sensitive medievalists who feel pressed to sing extra chorum because they have conclusive evidence that the
translation of the Latin esse (as also of the Greek einai) by the usual existence-terminology leads to a flawed interpretation of the 'onto-logical' thought world where use is made
of the 'being'-term ens (and its Greek equivalent).
The basic issue is simple enough, but precisely because it is so simple and obvious it runs the risk of being overlooked. All I can do here is present a series of brief pointers
toward the fateful bifurcation of the Latin esse (and the Greek einai) into 'be(ing)' and 'exist(ence).' In doing this, I hope that an objective listing of the pertinent facts
which, in their roots, are of an unambiguous linguistic nature, will constitute an instance of that philosophical rhetoric which in the same issue of American Catholic Philosophical
Quarterly was called a 'technique of persuasion.' (2) pp. 89-90.
(1) Russell Panier and Thomas D. Sullivan, "Aquinas on 'Exists'," in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67, (1993), 247.
(2) id. p. 257.
———. 1995. "Existence Vs. Being: An All-Important Matter of Terminology." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 69 (1):89-95.
"In classical Latin, the verb esse, incompletely rendered by today's 'to be,' was the word expressing what today is divided over the verbs 'be' and 'exist.' As I quoted
Vlastos in reference to the similar situation in Greek ( 'Ens' described as 'Being or existent' 13), 'This kind of knowledge ... even a Greek child would have had. I invited our contemporary
philosophers 'to crawl under the linguistic thought-skin of adult Greek and Latin philosophers,' not perhaps in order to agree but at least to understand what they were saying (and then, if they see
fit, to disagree). When, by some mysterious process, the verb existere began to be used as the participle of esse, the inevitable apparently happened: the fuller meaning of
esse, was gradually-and uncritically-transferred to existere. The etymology of ex(s)istere yields a simple sense, namely, 'come out of,' 'appear' and 'be there,' indicating
yes-or-no situations; consequently, the richer meaning of Aquinas's esse (the verb) was fated to become flattened to indicate (rather than 'signify') the plain fact of 'exist(ence)' (often
referred to by the new late-Latin noun existentia, see n. 4). The mountainous landscape where Aquinas saw a rich variety of interconnected 'beings' was leveled to the flatland of isolated,
barren existents; the various depths of the existing beings came to be viewed as a conglomerate of unrelated, juxtaposed existents."
O'Meara, Dominic. 1976. "Being in Numenius and Plotinus. Some Points of Comparison." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 21:120-129.
Reprinted in: D. O' Meara - The structure of Being and the search for the Good. Essays on ancient and early medieval Platonism - Aldershot, Asgate Variorum, 1998 Essay
———. 1990. "La Question De L'être Et Du Non-Être Des Objets Mathématiques Chez Plotin Et Jamblique." Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie no. 122:405-416.
Reprinted in: D. O' Meara - The structure of Being and the search for the Good. Essays on ancient and early medieval Platonism - Aldershot, Asgate Variorum, 1998 Essay
Owens, Joseph. 1963. An Elementary Christian Metaphysics. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company.
Reprinted Houston, Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985.
Pannier, Russell, and Sullivan, Thomas D. 1993. "Aquinas on 'Exists'." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 67 (2):157-166.
"At the outset of On Being and Essence Aquinas distinguishes two senses of "ens" (being or existent). This distinction furnishes a convenient point of entry for
his entire metaphysics. Aquinas is primarily concerned with "ens" in the first sense, roughly the sense we have in mind when we say something is real. He points to a second, broader sense to
ward off confusions. But if the meaning of the second sense is unclear, it will be all too easy to infer, as many seem to, that if something is a being in the second sense, it must be a being in the
first sense as well, albeit a rather shadowy one. For this reason we here shall propose an interpretation of Aquinas's second sense of "ens." As an aid to this clarification, we shall
contrast Aquinas's second sense with the sense of "exists" articulated by Frege. Some philosophers claim that Aquinas's second sense is identical to Frege's sense. We shall argue that, although
logically related in certain contexts, the senses are nevertheless distinct. We shall note toward the end the significance of this second sense for discussions of such topics as intentional
in-existence." p. 157
See, e.g., G.E.M. Anscombe and P.T. Geach, Three Philosophers (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 90; The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas:Introductory
Readings, ed. by Christopher Martin (London & New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 49; Hermann Weidemann, "The Logic of Being in Thomas Aquinas," in The Logic of Being: Historical
Studies, ed. by Simo Knuuttila and laakko Hintikka (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster/Tokyo: D. Reidel, 1986), pp. 81-200, especially p. 182.
———. 1995. "Being, Existence and the Future of Thomistic Studies: A Reply to Professor Nijenhuis." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 69 (1):83-88.
"Our aim is to explain as briefly as we can (1) why there is good reason to use 'existence-terminology,' and (2) why some considerations against it, including what we take to be
Professor Nijenhuis's main reasons, should not deter us. In the course of discussing these points we also will indicate why any of this matters for the future of Thomistic studies.
The first reason to permit oneself to use 'existent' or 'existing thing' for 'ens' is that fine dictionaries such as The New Shorter Oxford and The American
Heritage (totake a couple at hand) give 'existence' as the first entry under 'being.' That, no doubt, is why translators commonly use 'existence-terminology.' Professor Nijenhuis acknowledges
that dictionaries inter-define being and existence and that translators follow suit, but he thinks that both err. Maybe so, but it seems quite clear who bears the onus probandi.
The second reason, often neglected by proponents of 'being-terminology,' is that if we refuse to allow that when Aquinas talks in terms of 'ens' and 'esse' he is talking in one way
or another about existing things and about existence, we have no way of comparing Aquinas on existence with anyone who talks about existence. To insist that Aquinas is not talking about the same
topic as Frege, Russell, Quine and others because 'ens,' 'esse' and the like are to be translated only in terms of 'being' is to beg some pretty big questions and to seal off Aquinas's thought from
the contemporary world of ideas. No doubt some feel that it is more important to understand Aquinas in light of predecessors such as Clarenbald of Arras than Frege, but it seems to us that unless at
some point we are willing to consider how Aquinas's thought holds up when examined with the best contemporary work in mind, we will certainly not have served Aquinas or philosophy well." pp.
Paprzycka, Katarzyna. 1993. "Carnap and Leibniz on the Problem of Being." In Possible Ontologies, edited by Augustynek, Zdzislaw and Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz, 163-177.
"The title of the present paper appears provocative as it brings together one of the most prominent fighters of metaphysics, R. Carnap, a famous metaphysician and a very difficult
metaphysical problem. In fact, Leibniz, whose stance on that very issue we have chosen to relate to that of Carnap's, has not written about the problem of being explicitly either. We will thus ask
the reader for some patience as we will try to demonstrate that they both do so implicitly.
Our task is perhaps even more complex with respect to Carnap for aside of being an extraordinarily consistent and systematic thinker, he has also been very self-conscious
methodologically. It is remarkable that the system of Aufbau, to which we will restrict our attention, was supposed to be a mere illustration of some methodological principles developed in
the so-called construction theory. Accordingly, almost none of the moves in his system lacks a justification. As a result, there are not too many degrees of interpreter's freedom." (p. 163)
Pécharman, Martine. 1992. "Le Vocabulaire De L'être Dans La Philosophie Première: Ens, Esse, Essentia." In Hobbes Et Son Vocabulaire, edited by Zarka, Yves
Charles, 31-59. Paris: Vrin.
Price, Robert. 1970. "Richard of Middleton O.F.M. On 'Esse and Essence'." Franciscan Studies no. 30:49-76.
Principe, Walter H. 1967. Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
See Chapter I. The Philosophical Background (pp. 21-72) , in particular § 2. Ens, Esse, and Existere (pp. 23-42).
Rijk, Lambertus Maria de. 1981. "Boèce Logicien Et Philosophe: Ses Positions Sémantiques Et Sa Métaphysique De L'ëtre." In Atti Del Congresso Internazionale Di Studi Boeziani
(Pavia, 5-8 Ottobre 1980), edited by Obertello, Luca, 141-156. Roma: Herder.
Rosen, Stanley. 1991. "Is Metaphysics Possible?" Review of Metaphysics no. 45:235-257.
Schnädelbach, Herbert. 1984. "Being." In Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933, 192-218. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"If, in what follows under the general title of 'Being', we are to give an outline of the rebirth of metaphysics as ontology, we cannot avoid giving an account in detail of the
various ontological projects of that time. What is to be clarified can be described as a rehabilitation of the 'problem of being' as a genuinely philosophical problem. This 'problem of being' must
obviously be posed in such a way that it cannot be solved by any of the procedures of the empirical sciences; otherwise, any philosophical theory of being would be superfluous. On the other hand, the
'problem of being' should also not be reducible to the problem of knowledge, as the whole of Criticism had taught, since then the attempt to break out of the epistemological ghetto would fail. A
third general condition, accepted by all the new ontologists, is that modern ontology should not proceed in a dogmatic fashion in Kant's sense; this also rules out simple reference back to
pre-Kantian traditions. The rehabilitation of philosophy as theory of knowledge also remains decisive for the new ontology, to the extent that it regards an epistemological self-justification as
absolutely indispensable. The priority of the question of being over that of knowledge, which is the general characteristic of the new ontology, should itself he seen as the result of epistemological
reflection: since the time of Lotze, the argument that the subject is him: self an existent and the knowledge-relation a relation of, being had played a central role in that connexion. In Hegel's
words, the new ontology saw itself as an immanent critique of epistemology, not as its simple opposite. The success of this critique was then felt as the great liberation 'to things themselves'."
Schönberger, Rolf. 1986. Die Transformation Des Klassischen Seinsverständnisses. Studien Zur Vorgeschiche Des Neuzeitlichen Seinsbegriffs Im Mittelalter. Berlin: Walter de
Seigfried, Hans. 1972. "Kant's Thesis About Being Anticipated by Suarez." In Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, edited by Beck, Leslie, 510-520.
Simons, Peter M:. 2001. "L'être: Une Petite Histoire Autrichienne." In La Philosophie Autrichienne De Bolzano À Musil, edited by Cometti, Jean-Pierre and Mulligan, Kevin,
29-42. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin.
Sprung, Mervyn, ed. 1978. The Question of Being. East-West Perspectives. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Each chapter in this book (except the first) originated at a symposium arranged by the philosophy department of Brock University, St. Catherines, Ontario.
Contents: Mervyn Sprung: The Question of Being as comparative philosophy 1; Some Western Perspectives: Joseph Owens: Being in early Western tradition 17; Charles H. Kahn: Linguistic
relativism and the Greek project of ontology 31; Hans Georg Gadamer: Plato and Heidegger 45; Zygmunt Adamczewski: Questions in Heidegger's thought about Being 55; Robert C. Schaff: Heidegger's path
of thinking and the Way of Meditation in the early Upanisads 67; Some eastern perspectives: Wilhelm Halbfass: On Being and What There Is: Indian perspectives on the Question of Being 95; J. G.
Arapura: Some special characteristics of Sat (Being) in Advaita Vedanta 111; Mervyn Sprung: Being and the Middle Way 127; Jitendra Nath Mohanty: Some aspects of Indian thinking on Being 141;
Szaif, Jan. 2003. Der Sinn Von "Sein": Grundlinien Einer Rekonstruktion Des Philosophischen Begriffs Des Seienden. Freiburg: Alber.
Inhalt: Vorbemerkung 7;
Der Sinn von "sein". Grundlinien einer Rekonstruktion des philosophischen Begriffs des Seienden. Einleitung 13
Gibt es eine philosophisch relevante Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Sinn von "sein"?
a) Die Formulierung der ontologischen Grundfrage als Frage nach dem Sinn von "sein" 16; b) Zur Geschichte der ontologischen Grundfrage 18; c) Die Zielsetzung der Wiederaufnahme der
ontologischen Grundfrage 20; d) Ergänzende Bemerkungen zur Methode 22; e) Vier semantische Grundfunktionen von "sein": i) Die Kopula als "offene Prädikatsform" 25; ii) Das "ist" in identifizierenden
Aussagen 32; iii) Existenz 32; iv) Veritatives Sein 37; f) Die Antwort: Der Sinn von "sein" -- eine in aller gegenständlichen Bezugnahme immer schon vorausgesetzte semantische Verweisungsstruktur 39;
g) Ist diese Sinnstruktur nur ein sprachgeschichtlicher Zufall? 45;
Die mögliche Rolle der ontologischen Grundfrage für eine (heute noch durchführbare) Metaphysik
a) Das Problem der thematischen Eingrenzung der Metaphysik als philosophischer Disziplin 47; b) Metaphysik als " transphysica" - zwei Deutungstypen 49; c) Die Differenz von
positionalem und formalem Seinssinn als Grund zweier fundamentaler ontologischer Fragedimensionen 52; d) Die Entfaltung der ontologischen Grundfrage als Organisationsprinzip für eine philosophische
Metaphysik; die Rolle erkenntnis- und sprachkritischer Erörterungen 56; e) Das Verhältnis der ontologisch-metaphysischen Fragestellung zu anderen philosophischen Grundfragen 65; Anmerkungen 72;
Ernst Tugendhat über die 'Seinsfrage' als fundamentalphilosophische Fragestellung 91
Thom, Paul. 2002. "The Pervasiveness of Being." In Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W.,
293-302. Aldershot: Ashgate.
"The pervasiveness of Being is the doctrine that everything is. This doctrine would he false if something was not. That being is pervasive is not a trivial claim. An ontology might
he motivated by the desire to quantify over non-beings in such a way that we can say that something is a flying man without implying that some being is a flying man. If such a
distinction is allowed, then it might be thought that something is not, even though no being is not. Pervasiveness then would be true for beings but not for 'somethings.'
This chapter explores the different positions that philosophers from Parmenides to Aristotle take on the question of the pervasiveness of Being, and traces some of the relations
linking those positions to one another."
Verhaar, John W.M., ed. 1967. The Verb 'Be' and Its Synonyms. Philosophical and Grammatical Studies. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Part I: Classical Chinese. Athapaskan. Mundari, 1967, pp. viii+100; Part II: Eskimo Hindi. Zuni. Modern Greek. Malayalam. Kurukh. 1968, pp. ix+ 148; Part III:
Japanese. Kashmiri. Armenian. Hungarian. Sumerian. Shona. 1968, pp. viii+ 125; Part IV: Twi. Modern Chinese. Arabic. 1969, pp. viii+ 125; Part V: 1972, pp. vii+ 232; Part VI:
The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek. By Charles H. Kahn. 1973, pp. xxxiii+ 486.
Zaslawsky, Denis. 1982. Analyse De L'être. Essai De Philosophie Analytique. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.